Verlagstext:
This sequel to the modem classic "Markets and Hierarchies" develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labor as well as the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labor policy, and SEC and public utility regulations."
Stimmen zum Buch:
"For a historian concerned with the evolution of modern institutions, this is the most valuable book written by an economist since those of Joseph Schumpeter." - Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Harvard Business School
" Williamson works on a much broader canvas than before and demonstrates the power of his approach in understanding such elusive phenomena as contract relations, vertical integration, labor unions, and antitrust law." - Kenneth J. Arrow
"An extraordinarily impressive achievement and must reading for all serious students of law, economics, and organization...The Economic Institutions of Capitalism synthesizes Oliver Williamson's extensive work on these subjects with related work of other scholars in a comprehensive and stimulating presentation of the theory and applications of a new institutional economics that is changing the way we think about many issues in law, economics, and organization." - Paul L. Joskow.
/ AUS DEM INHALT: / / / Preface To The Paperback Edition
Preface
Prologue
Antecedents from the 1930s
The Next Thirty Years
An Overview
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction Costs
A Cognitive Map of Contract
The World of Contract
A Simple Contracting Schema
Economic Organization of the Company Town
Applications
Concluding Remarks
Contractual Man
Behavioral Assumptions
Dimensions
The Fundamental Transformation
Appendix: Opportunism: A Digression
The Governance of Contractual Relations
Contracting Traditions
Efficient Governance
Uncertainty
Measurement
The Distribution of Transactions
Vertical Integration: Theory and Policy
Technological Determinism
A Heuristic Model
Further Implications
Vertical Merger Guidelines
Vertical Integration: Some Evidence
Types of Evidence
Mundane Integration
Forward Integration into Distribution
Lateral Integration
Backward Integration
Some Remarks About Japanese Manufacture
Some Alternative Explanations
Concluding Remarks
The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features
A Chronic Puzzle
Integration of an Owner-Managed Supply Stage
Acquisition of a Supply Stage in Which Ownership and Management Are Separated
The Costs of Bureaucracy
Low-Powered Incentives in Markets
Illustrative Examples
Concluding Remarks
Credible Commitments I: Unilateral Applications
Private Ordering
Credible Commitments
The Hostage Model
Engaging the Supplier
Unilateral Trading Applications
Schwinn
Credible Commitments II: Bilateral Applications
Reciprocity
The Hostage Model Extended
Petroleum Exchanges
Concluding Remarks
The Organization of Work
The Radical Account of Hierarchy
Transaction Cost Aspects
A Comparative Institutional Framework
A Comparative Institutional Assessment
Power Versus Efficiency
Concluding Remarks
The Organization of Labor
Central Issues
An Abstract Approach
Union Organization
Problematic Features of Union Organization
The Producer Cooperative Dilemma
Dignity
Concluding Remarks
The Modern Corporation
Railroad Organization
The M-Form Innovation
Applications: Conglomerate and Multinational Enterprise
Concluding Remarks
Corporate Governance
Background
A Contractual Assessment
Management as a Constituency
Managerial Discretion and Organization Form
Concluding Remarks
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly
Introduction
The Simple Franchise Bidding Scheme
Franchise Bidding Elaborated
A Case Study
Concluding Remarks
Appendix: The Oakland CATV Franchise Bidding Experience
Antitrust Enforcement
Merger Policy
Nonstandard Contracting
Strategic Behavior
Unresolved Dilemmas
Concluding Remarks
Conclusions
Transaction Cost Economics
Economics
Law
Organization